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Abstract 
This paper is a cross-sectional analysis of the demand for prescription painkillers. Demand was 
broken down into illegal adult use of painkillers, illegal adolescent use, and legal prescriptions 
per capita for each state. Data for 2012 were taken from the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH) and the National Prescription Audit as well as from other sources such as the 
Census Bureau. Prescription drug monitoring programs were found to decrease illegal use, while 
medical marijuana laws and poverty rates increased legal use and use among teens. Both white 
population and number of officers decreased illegal use among adults, but increased legal 
demand. Regions with more very religious people saw increased legal demand, while regions 
with higher education rates saw decreased demand. Single mothers reduced illegal use among 
teens. Future studies should look at demand over a longer period of time and try to find measures 
of illegal use with more variation. 
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In the 2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, the DEA listed controlled 
prescription drugs as the fastest growing drug abuse threat in the United States. The most widely 
abused category of prescription drugs is prescription painkillers, which account for 73 percent of 
the nonmedical users of prescription drugs (DEA, 2013). The CDC has declared prescription 
drug abuse as an epidemic (ONDCP). Emergency room visits resulting from prescription drug 
misuse or abuse increased 114 percent from 2004 to 2011 (DHHS, 2013). The cost for the 
medical treatment resulting from prescription drug abuse has been estimated at over $72 billion 
per year (DHHS, 2013). The most startling consequence of this epidemic has been the number 
of overdoses. According to the NIH, more people die each year from prescription opioid 
(painkiller) abuse than all other drugs combined. 
When taken improperly, these medications can have effects similar to heroin. Many 
users end up turning to heroin, because it is cheaper and easier to obtain. Recent studies have 
found that among young intravenous heroin users, almost half began by abusing prescription 
drugs (NIDA, 2014). This should be especially concerning considering that prescription drugs 
are second only to marijuana as the most commonly abused drugs among young people 
(ONDCP). The rise in intravenous heroin and prescription drug abuse also raises the risk of HIV 
among users through the sharing of needles (NIDA, 2014). 
What's fueling this epidemic of abuse? Part of the problem is that there has been a 
dramatic rise in prescriptions issued. The number of prescriptions issued increased by 400 
percent from 1999 to 2010 (CDC, 2015). Some of these prescriptions are coming from facilities 
known as "pill mills." These are clinics that sell a large amount of medication without giving 
comprehensive exams, usually on a cash-only basis (DHHS, 2013). Another popular source of 
prescription opioids for addicts is emergency rooms. Thirteen percent of those receiving 
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treatment report that they received their painkillers from emergency rooms. Addicts choose 
emergency rooms because it is harder for doctors to get a complete history on patients, which 
makes it harder for them to identify those with addictions (DHHS, 2013). Of course, these drugs 
are also available through dealers and over the internet, but only 5 percent of those abusing 
painkillers get them from these sources (ONDCP). The biggest source of prescription drugs is 
actually friends and relatives. Seventy percent of people who abuse prescription drugs reported 
getting them from friends and relatives (ONDCP). 
This paper will use cross-sectional analysis to determine what is driving this demand for 
prescription drugs, both legally and illegally obtained. A special focus will be placed on the role 
of prescription drug monitoring programs and medical marijuana laws, which are discussed in 
more detail below. Since the literature on this topic is very sparse, this paper will instead try to 
draw from the general literature on drug abuse. The sparse literature also lends itself to a more 
experimental approach to modeling, as one will see in the model section. 
1.1 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) 
In order to combat this growing threat, states have begun setting up programs to collect, 
monitor, and analyze data on the distribution of prescription drugs. There are currently 49 states 
with active PD MPs and the District of Colombia has recently passed legislation to set up their 
own. The only state without a PDMP is Missouri (Brandeis, 2012). The first state to set up a 
prescription drug monitoring program was New York in 1918 (Brandeis, 2012). While there 
were more states that started up programs going back to the 1930s, about 70 percent of PD MPs 
were established between 2000 and 2010 (Brandeis, 2012). 
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These programs have been very successful in reducing the misuse of prescription drugs. 
Florida, home to 90 of the top 100 oxycodone purchasers, enacted legislation in 2010 and in 
2012 saw a 50 percent decrease in oxycodone overdose deaths (DHHS, 2013; CDC, 2015). One 
year after modifying their programs to require physicians to check state databases before handing 
out prescriptions, both New York and Tennessee saw drops in the number of patients seeing 
multiple doctors by 75 percent and 36 percent respectively (CDC, 2015). Oregon was able to 
decrease the amount of poisoning deaths due to opioid abuse by 38 percent between 2006 and 
2013 thanks to their program (CDC, 2015), 
While almost all states have PD MPs, they vary in how they collect data, who can access 
the data, and how the data is used. This paper will focus on states with mandatory PDMP laws 
to see how effective they are versus non-mandatory laws. This is similar to how Pacula (2013) 
broke down medical marijuana laws into states with registries and dispensaries in her study. 
1.2 Medical Marijuana Laws (MMLs) 
Today, 23 states and the District of Colombia have medical marijuana laws (NCSL, 
2015). These laws vary in the conditions that can be treated with marijuana and the amount an 
individual is allowed to possess (HOPES, 2012). Some states, such as New Mexico, only allow 
medical marijuana to be used for certain conditions such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, and glaucoma 
(HOPES, 2012). Other states, like California, allow medical marijuana use for a long list of 
conditions including migraines and chronic pain (HOPES, 2012). The ability for patients to take 
marijuana for pain relief (in both sets of states) should have some impact on the amount of legal 
opioid prescriptions. This lowered demand for legal prescriptions should result in a reduced 
supply of illegal opioids, which would increase the price and lower the illegal demand for 
prescription opioids. 
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Another effect of medical marijuana laws is a decrease in the price of marijuana, 
especially higher grade strains (Anderson, 2013). This decreased price should tell us about the 
relationship between marijuana and prescription drug abuse. If the two are true substitutes, then 
prescription drug abuse should go down in states that pass medical marijuana laws. If they are 
complements, then one would expect to see higher prescription drug use in states with medical 
marijuana laws. Due to data limitations, this paper will not be able to determine which, if either, 
of these relationships these two drugs have. It is still important to note that one of these effects 
may be taking place. 
2. Literature Review 
Previous literature on the economics of drug use is quite diverse. On the subject of drug 
addictions, there have been a variety of factors considered by different authors. In his rational 
addiction model, Becker focused heavily on how the past consumption of addictive goods 
influenced their current consumption (Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and Murphy, 1988). 
When thought of as inputs to produce certain effects (such as euphoria), the present use of drugs 
increases the cost of producing the same effects in the future (Stigler and Becker, 1977). This is 
a demonstration of tolerance, when addicts must use more of the same drug to get the desired 
effect (Becker and Murphy, 1988). The model explains that those with higher discount rates will 
be more prone to addiction, which is why some drug users do not become addicts (they have 
lower discount rates) (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Becker's model also helps to explain that 
stressful events can trigger addiction because they lower an individual's utility while raising the 
marginal utility of addictive goods (like drugs) (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Bachman et al. 
(1998) looked at whether lifestyle factors or societal factors were more important in teen 
marijuana use over the past several decades. They found that lifestyle factors play a major role 
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in an individual's decision. But when it came to usage rates among groups, the more important 
factors were perceived risk and societal acceptance. While Bachman et al. focused only on 
young people, it will be important to consider both of these sets of factors when studying the 
general population. In a 2007 study on criminal penalties and marijuana use, Pacula et al. found 
that lower criminal penalties and medical marijuana laws raised prices. This increase in price 
was concluded to be from a large increase in demand, due to both lower risk and more social 
acceptance of the drug, and little change in supply because of the low risk premium. Of course, 
there are differences between the markets for prescription painkillers and marijuana, but these 
studies are still important in determining what types of factors may play a role in demand. 
Another strand of literature concerns the relationship between two different drugs. One 
of the earliest researchers to address this topic was Denice Kandel (197 6). Kandel found that 
drug use comes in stages. Most adolescents start with alcohol or tobacco, then begin using 
marijuana, and finally moving to harder drugs. This would eventually become known as the 
gateway effect. There are some who question whether or not there actually is a "gateway effect." 
Morral et al. have suggested that marijuana may not cause the use of harder drugs, but rather 
those who use marijuana are already more likely to use hard drugs and are just exposed to 
marijuana first. After surveying the literature, Hall and Lynskey (2005) found that while 
common factor models like the one posited by Morral et al. explain some of the correlation 
between marijuana use and hard drug use among youth, a gateway effect is still present. 
Specifically, they find that early use of marijuana and higher frequency of use lead to a higher 
probability of hard drug use. 
While the gateway drug use debate is an important part of the literature, one will notice 
that it focuses only on youth. This is an important point because there is evidence that marijuana 
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affects the brain of an adolescent differently than it does that of an adult. Medical researchers 
have found that adolescent rats injected with THC exhibited changes in the brain that made them 
more susceptible to opiate addictions (Ellgren et al., 2006). In their analysis on the impact of 
medical marijuana laws on marijuana use, drinking and hard drug use, Wen and colleagues broke 
the sample down into two different age groups. Their first age group was those who were 
between 12 and 20, and the second was those 21 years old and over (Wen et al., 2014). They 
found that marijuana use rose for those over 21, but not for the first age group. They also found 
that binge drinking increased for those over 21, but medical marijuana laws had no effect on 
underage drinking. Neither group experienced a change in hard drug use. The final result of 
their study somewhat conflicts the results of Chu (2013 ), who found that proportion of adults 
(18+) seeking treatment for heroin addiction actually fell in medical marijuana states. However, 
this conflict could be due to the fact that Chu uses the proportion of heroin treatments versus 
total treatments; therefore it is possible that some of this decline is caused by an increase in 
treatments for other drugs. This paper will also divide up the age groups, but in a different 
fashion than in Wen et al. (2014 ). A relationship between medical marijuana laws and 
prescription drug use is still hypothesized despite Wen et al.'s findings that marijuana did not 
affect the use of harder drugs because of the different nature of prescription drugs. 
3. Model 
In order to get a fuller picture, this paper will examine three different types of demand for 
prescription drugs. The first type of demand will be for illegal prescription drugs among those 
18 years of age and older, which will be estimated using the following model: 
ILPDUA,= Po+ P1 ManPDMP, + p2 MML, + P3 Prescripts,+ p4 White,+ Ps Old,+ P6 College,+ P1 Poverty,+ 
p80fficers, + P9 Very Religious,+ e,. 
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The dependent variable !LP DU As is the estimated percentage of the adult (18+) population in 
each state that misused prescriptions drugs in 2012. Using estimates as a dependent variable 
does pose some problems, but there are limited sources of data for illegal prescription drug use. 
Therefore this paper will continue to use these estimates provided by the National Survey of 
Drug Use and Health. The first independent variable, ManPDMPs, is a dummy variable that 
indicates the presence of a prescription drug monitoring program with mandatory enrollment. 
MMLs is a dummy variable that indicates the presence of a medical marijuana law. Prescriptss 
measures the number of prescriptions for painkillers issued per 100 people for each state. Whites 
is the percentage of population in each state that is white. Having this variable helps to control 
for differences in use related to culture or access. Olds is the percentage of the population over 
65 years of age in each state. This variable is meant to capture a possible supply factor, since a 
vast majority of prescriptions for painkillers are issued for individuals in that age group. 
Colleges is the percentage of population in a state with at least a bachelor's degree. Poverty5 is 
the percentage of the state's population living under the poverty line. Both of these variables 
represent a potential opportunity cost of using illegal drugs, with those receiving bachelor's 
degrees having a higher cost and those under the poverty having a lower cost due to potential 
total lost income 1• Those under the poverty line might also gain greater utility from using these 
drugs because of a need to have an escape from their current circumstances. Officerss is the 
number of police officers employed in a state as a percentage of the population. The purpose of 
this variable is to capture the legal risk for drug abusers. VeryReligiouss is the percentage of 
people in each state that identify themselves as such. This variable is to test if states with more 
religious populations are less likely to have problems with prescription painkiller abuse than less 
religious states. With most drugs this variable would be assumed to be negative, but since 
1 It should be noted that the value of a lost dollar of income is greater for the poorer person. 
10 
prescription drugs come from doctors there is a possibility that their use is more acceptable in 
these communities and thus will face less competition from other drugs. In this case, a positive 
relationship is plausible. 
Next, this paper will examine the illegal prescription painkiller demand for adolescents, 
those from ages 12 to 17. In order to estimate this demand the following model will be used: 
ILPDUYs= Bo+ B1 ManPDMPs + B2 MMLs + B3 Prescriptss + B4 Whites+ Bs Olds+ B6 Colleges+ B7 Poverty,+ 
BsOfficerss+ B9 VeryReligious5 +Bio SMom, + l::s-
As one can see, the model is almost identical to the model for illegal prescription opioid abuse 
among adults. The biggest difference is the last variable, SMom5, which represents the 
percentage of households headed by a single mother in each state. The hypothesis is that 
adolescents living with single mothers will have higher rates of opioid use due to less 
supervision. A more subtle difference is the estimated effect of the bachelor's degree variable. 
Instead ofrepresenting an opportunity cost of using illegal prescription painkillers, it is now 
hypothesized to have an impact on the environment of the youth. If the teen is growing up in a 
state with higher rates of education, the perceived risk of illegal drug use may be higher than in 
other states. 
The third and final type of demand that will be studied is the demand for legal 
prescription painkillers. As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a dramatic rise in the 
amount of legal prescriptions over the past several years. While these are legally obtained, at 
least a portion of these drugs will likely be misused. The model for the demand for legal 
prescriptions will be the following: 
Prescripts5 =Bo+ B1 ManPDMP, + B2 MML, + B3 White,+ B4 Old,+ Bs College,+ B6 Poverty5 + B10fficers, +Bs YeryReligious, 
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The dependent variable in this model is the same independent variable measuring number of 
prescription painkillers issued per 100 people used in the previous models. All of the variables 
are expected to have the same effect on legal prescription drug demand that they have on illegal 
prescription demand. 
Other variables that were tested in these models, but rejected include state unemployment 
rates, insurance rates, single father households, and dummy variables for region of the country. 
These variables were rejected because they were insignificant. Results for models with these 
variables and more explanation for why they were rejected are included in Appendix A. 
4. Data 
Summary statistics for the variables included in the models and their data sources can be 
seen below in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Data Sourcesa 
Variable Name Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
I LP DUA Illegal 4.337761 0.6218594 3.401962 5.595697 
Prescription 
Drug Abuse for 
Adults 
I LP DUY Illegal 5.087339 0.8630669 3.525025 7.151932 
Prescription 
Drug Abuse for 
Adolescents 
Prescripts Prescriptions 87.39216 22.43308 52 143 
for Painkillers 
per 100 people 
MML Dummy for 0.3921569 .4930895 0 1 
presence of 
medical 
marijuana law 
ManPDMP Dummy for 0.3137255 0.4686233 0 1 
presence of 
mandatory 
12 
pd mp 
White % population 70.0833 16.12817 22.84817 94.14479 
white 
Old % population 13.97704 1.708854 8.544273 18.16851 
over 65 years 
old 
College Proportion of 26.50953 5.634821 17.31328 48.41218 
state with at 
least a 
Bachelor's 
degree 
Poverty %of 15.21569 3.273309 10 24.2 
population 
living under 
poverty line 
Officers Number of 0.2163405 0.0798358 0.1206395 0.6824044 
officers per 
100 people 
VeryReligious % of state 39.76471 9.036788 23 59 
population that 
identify as very 
religious 
SM om Proportion of 12.40109 2.283076 8.064782 19.22118 
households 
headed by 
single mothers 
a. ILPDUA and ILPDUY taken from 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(NSDUH). Prescripts comes from IMS National Prescription Audit via a CDC Vital 
Signs report. MML data comes from the National Conference of State Legislators 
(NCSL). ManPDMP comes from Brandeis University's Training and Technical 
Assistance Center (TTAC). White, Old, College, Poverty, and SMom come from the 
Census Bureau. Officers was taken from the FBI' s Police Employee Data. Very 
Religious comes from a 2011 Gallup Poll. 
In this model, Medical Marijuana Laws are present in 20 states and mandatory PDMPs are 
present in 16 states. Southern states are generally the most religious states and also have some of 
the highest prescription rates for prescription pain killers, although not all of the states with high 
prescription rates are very religious. Both ILPDUA and !LP DUY have low standard deviations 
meaning that our results from these models will be limited because we are measuring small 
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differences between states. Both of these models will be kept in the paper for general interest 
and to learn what variables may be important if better data becomes available in the future. 
5. Results 
Table 2 displays the results of each of the models and their significance. An additional 
table is available in Appendix C that shows the economic significance of the variables for the 
Prescripts model. Surprisingly, MML was not very economically significant even though it was 
statistically significant. Officers was more significant, but Old was almost as economically 
significant even though it was not statistically significant. 
Table 2. Final Results 
Variables ILPDUA ILPDUV Prescripts (robust se) 
ManPDMP -0.3597441 ** -0.46673* 0.973143 
MML 0.3033757 0.761195** 13.08175** 
Prescripts 0.0172406** 0.0142172* N/A 
White -0.0138188** -0.0183286 0.637359** 
Old -0.0722657 -0.0097175 0.9416391 
College 0.0161832 0.0196863 -1.081213* 
Poverty 0.0545355 0.1467168 ** 2.558175** 
Officers -2.836871 ** -0.6177977 81.06522** 
VeryReligious -0.0161768 0.0174525 1.297201 ** 
SM om N/A -0.1664375** N/A 
Constant 4.801676** 3.862535* -55.25522 
Adjusted R2 0.4623 0.3914 0. 6822 (non-adjusted) 
a. * denotes significant at 0.1 level. ** denotes significant at 0.05 level. 
As one can see mandatory prescription drug monitoring programs and number of legal 
prescriptions both appear to affect illegal drug use for both adolescents and adults. States with 
PD MPs have lower misuse rates of 0.36 percentage points for adults and 0.46 percentage points 
for teens. Legal prescription drugs raise the rates of misuse by 0.017 percentage points among 
the adult population and 0.014 percentage points among youth. States with more predominately 
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white populations have lower rates of drug abuse for adults. A one percentage point increase in 
the white population decreases illegal drug use for adults by 0.014 percentage points. 
There are some variables that affect one population, but do not affect the other. Medical 
marijuana laws raise youth abuse by 0.76 percentage points, but do not affect adult use. The 
youth population is also affected by poverty rates and the proportion of households headed by 
single mothers. Higher poverty rates increase prescription drug abuse, while a greater proportion 
of single mothers decrease use. A 1 percentage point increase in poverty rates increases abuse 
by 0 .146 percentage points and a 1 percentage point increase in rates of single mothers decreases 
abuse by 0.166 percentage points. The ratio of police to civilians has an effect on the adult 
population, but not on the youth population. A 1 percentage point increase in the officer 
population leads to a 2.84 percentage point decrease in prescription drug abuse among adults. 
Legal drug prescriptions are influenced by medical marijuana laws, poverty rates, 
education, race, religion, and the ratio of police to civilians. States with medical marijuana laws 
had 13 .08 more prescriptions per 100 people. Poverty increased legal prescription use, with a 1 
percentage point increase in the poverty rate leading to an increase in legal drug prescriptions by 
2.56 prescriptions. States with higher education rates saw the amount of legal prescriptions drop 
by 1.08 prescriptions per 100 people. While having a more predominantly white population led 
to lower illegal painkiller use among adults, it also led to higher legal prescription drug use with 
a 1 percentage point increase leading to an increase of 0.64 prescriptions. More religious states 
also saw higher legal prescription drug use with a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of population that identifies as very religious leading to an increase of 1.30 prescriptions. The 
number of police officers had a very strong positive relationship with the number of legal 
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prescriptions issued in the state. A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of police 
officers to the general public increased the number of prescriptions by 81.07 prescriptions. 
6. Robustness 
All three models were tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test. The test showed that heteroscedasticity was present for the model for legal 
demand (Prescripts), but not for the other two models. In order to correct for the 
heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were used. The positive test for legal demand can be 
seen below in Figure 1. Multicollinearity was also tested using correlation matrices and the 
variance inflation factor (vif). The vif was below 5 for every variable and none of the correlation 
matrices had a value over 0.7, so multicollinearity was determined not to be a problem. 
An alternate model using a dummy variable for states in the southern region of the 
country (as defined by the Census Bureau) was also performed. The results can been seen in 
Appendix B. This model had minimal effects on !LP DUA and !LP DUY models, but prescription 
drugs issued had a marked increase in explanatory power as well as some changes in the 
significance of other variables. While it is clear from the data that the region with the most 
prescription drugs is the south, what is not clear is why. Nothing about its geographic location 
would seem to have an effect, so there is something else that must be driving the higher demand. 
Since a causal relationship cannot be established between the south and prescription drug 
demand, it was decided that this model would not be used. 
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Figure 1: Heteroskedasticity Test for Prescripts model 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
7. Discussion 
3.46 
0.0631 
From the results above (in Table 2), one can see that PDMPs seem to be serving their 
intended purpose. Illegal use of prescription drugs is lower in states with PD MPs, but the legal 
demand is unaffected. It is somewhat surprising that legal demand did not go down since these 
laws are aimed at pill mills and other legal sources of painkillers for addicts. This might be due 
to the timing of the passage of these laws. If they were passed around 2012, their effects may 
not be felt yet. 
States with legalized medical marijuana saw higher illegal use of prescription painkillers 
among teens and higher legal demand for painkillers. The higher demand by teens may be due to 
a lower risk perception because it is now classified as something that can be medicinal. Adults 
are more likely to have already formed an opinion on the risk that marijuana poses, which may 
explain why medical marijuana laws do not have the same effect on that population. The higher 
legal demand is unexpected. It is likely that the restrictions on medical marijuana in many of 
these states prevents a substitution effect, but the positive effect is difficult to explain. There 
could be a higher acceptance of drug use in these states and those who abuse painkillers are 
known to get them from legal sources. 
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This also explains why the variable for legal prescriptions led to more illegal use of 
prescription drugs. Even if these legal prescriptions do not go directly to abusers, there is still a 
higher supply of drugs in these states. It was predicted that the variable for the percentage of 
population over age 65 would have a similar effect since they are the biggest legal users of 
prescription drugs, but there was no effect from the older population. 
The proportion of population that are white had different effects on legal and illegal 
prescription drug demand. Legal prescriptions were higher in states with more white 
populations. This could be due to differences in the access to prescription drugs or healthcare in 
general. A report by the Department of Health and Human Services found that minorities are 
subject to poorer healthcare in several areas in the United States (AHRQ, 2012). The lower 
illegal demand among adults is more difficult to explain, but may be linked to the quality of care 
mentioned above. Higher quality of care may mean that doctors are better equipped to identify 
those who may have developed a dependency on these drugs. Other possible explanations are 
that there are unidentified economic differences, or it may just be cultural differences. 
Neither education nor poverty rates have an effect on the illegal demand of prescription 
drugs among adults, but they do affect legal demand. An increase in the percentage of the 
population with a bachelor's lowers the legal demand while an increase in the poverty rate raises 
it. This could be due to the opportunity cost that was discussed earlier. It could also have to do 
with the information available to those with a higher education about the risk of these drugs, and 
a lack of information for those under the poverty line. Quality of healthcare is a third possibility, 
as those who are in poverty are likely to receive lower quality care (AHRQ, 2012), which may 
lead to more prescriptions being handed out without alternatives being considered. A final 
possibility is that, due to the nature of their likely occupations, those who are below the poverty 
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line may have more need for pain medications because of accidents or greater stress being put on 
their bodies. 
Poverty rates and the proportion of single mother households also had an effect on illegal 
drug use among teens. Poverty was positively related to illegal teen use, which is most likely 
attributable to a lower opportunity cost. The percentage of single mother households had a 
negative effect on teen prescription drug use. Since poverty is already controlled for, it is likely 
that these are working mothers. These working mothers may not have time to go to obtain or use 
prescription painkillers, meaning their children have less access to these drugs. 
The number of officers in each state had different effects for legal and illegal demand. 
Illegal demand for prescription painkillers among adults is negatively affected by the number of 
officers. This is most likely due to the fact that the legal risk is higher when there are more 
police and the supply of these drugs is more likely to be disrupted. The demand among youths, 
however, is unaffected by the number of police. This may be due to a lower perceived risk 
among youths or the belief that taking these drugs is not illegal since they have been prescribed 
by a doctor. Interestingly, legal demand was positively related to the number of officers. There 
is anecdotal evidence that illegal prescription drug use is linked to higher crime (Goodnough, 
201 O; Becker, 2011; Sanbum, 2015). It is likely that the states with higher legal demand also 
have higher illegal demand and have had this higher demand previous to 2012; therefore it may 
have been necessary for these states to hire more law enforcement. However, this connection 
would be better studied in another paper due to the potential endogeneity. 
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8. Conclusion 
The demand for prescription drugs has been growing at an alarming rate and more work 
needs to be done to understand this demand. This paper has examined some interesting 
relationships between prescription drug abuse and different factors including medical marijuana 
laws, prescription drug monitoring programs, legal prescriptions, and poverty rates. However, 
these relationships require further evaluations because of the low standard deviations of the 
dependent variables. 
Legal prescription painkiller demand was also examined in this paper and it did not suffer 
from low variability. The demand for legal prescriptions does offer some insight into illegal 
demand, because many drug abusers obtain their drugs from legal sources. The legal demand 
was not affected by prescription drug monitoring programs, but was affected by medical 
marijuana laws. Demand was also affected by race, poverty, education, religion, and the amount 
of law enforcement. 
To get an even better understanding of what affects prescription drug abuse, future 
studies should examine the demand over time. Unfortunately, the data on the number of legal 
prescription painkillers per state is only available for 2012. Not having this data also hurts the 
ability to model illegal use of prescriptions over time. Different measures for illegal use may 
also prove useful. Other variables may also become more useful over time, such as the 
legalization of recreational marijuana. 
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Appendix A: Rejected Variables 
Table 3: Results with Unemployment included 
Variables ILPDUA P-value ILPDUY P-value Prescripts P-value 
ManPDMP -0. 3607777** 0.028 -0.4781753 ** 0.050 0.8425853 0.859 
MML 0.2969129 0.195 o. 7974287** 0.023 12.00157* 0.070 
Prescripts 0. 0168254 * * 0.003 0.0144051* 0.087 N/A 
White -0. 0130916* 0.054 -0. 0177678 0.158 0. 6793656 ** 0.000 
Old -0. 0701304 0.139 -0. 0166896 0.809 1.100042 0.427 
College 0.0156426 0.465 0.01936 0.544 -1.089534* 0.080 
Poverty 0.0496189 0.170 0. 1574605 ** 0.005 2.015234 * 0.053 
Officers -2.810459 ** 0.034 -0. 6703927 0.723 80.40697** 0.031 
VeryReligious -0.0146351 0.347 0.0130252 0.568 1.38829 ** 0.001 
SM om N/A -0. 1389537 0.119 N/A 
Unemployment 0.0195533 0.686 -0.0599101 0.442 1.775659 0.212 
Constant 4.638357 ** 0.002 4.025933 * 0.075 -68.00287* 0.097 
Adjusted R2 0.4623 0.4511 0.3853 0.6270 
Unemployment (taken from Bureau of Labor and Statistics) was tested with the theory that those 
without jobs have more time to use drugs and less disincentive to use them because they do not 
have to worry about job loss. As one can see from the above table, unemployment was not 
significant. This does make sense even though one may be unemployed, they are still seeking 
work and failing a drug test would be a significant hurdle in getting a job. (In this case, the 
Prescripts model was found not to be heteroskedastic, as shown by the figure below). 
Figure 2: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with Unemployment included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 2.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1488 
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Table 4: Results with Uninsured included 
Variables ILPDUA P-value ILPDUY P-value Prescripts P-value 
(robust se) 
ManPDMP -0.3588687** 0.029 -0.4668821 * 0.056 0.9026982 0.854 
MML 0.3054206 0.183 0.7718847** 0.027 12.82426** 0.034 
Prescripts 0.0173619** 0.002 0.0144013* 0.088 N/A 
White -0.0135022 * * 0.043 -0.0166203 0.198 0.6094301 ** 0.000 
Old -0.0678675 0.177 0.0054606 0.941 0.6216404 0.622 
College 0.0185894 0.429 0.0276085 0.428 -1.242558 * 0.066 
Poverty 0.0506958 0.176 0.1324405** 0.024 2.808475** 0.001 
Officers -2.791444** 0.037 -0.4538755 0.813 77.14681 ** 0.021 
VeryReligious -0.0157429 0.301 0.0190239 0.395 1.255278** 0.008 
SM om N/A -0.1604344* 0.053 N/A 
Uninsured 0.0047047 0.802 0.016336 0.558 -0.3336338 0.469 
Constant 4.585219** 0.006 3.037325 0.250 -39.43005 0.411 
Adjusted R2 0.4497 0.3814 0.6849 (non-
adjusted) 
The rates of uninsured people in each state (obtained through the Census Bureau) was tested to 
see ifthe lower prices of prescription drugs and doctors' visits that come with insurance 
increased usage or not. It was found to not have an effect. This could be because of the higher 
insurance rates after the Affordable Care Act. The effect of this law on prescription drug usage 
could be a very good topic for a future paper, but since this variable is insignificant it will be left 
out of this paper. Below in Figure 3, one can see the positive test for heteroscedasticity for this 
model. 
Figure 3: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with Uninsured included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
2.84 
0.0921 
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Table 5: Results (for ILPDUY) with SDad included 
Variables ILPDUV P-value 
Man POMP -0. 5139595 ** 0.041 
MML 0. 8922962 ** 0.013 
Prescripts 0.0071663 0.366 
White -0. 0098539 0.431 
Old -0. 035234 0.633 
College -0. 013851 0.716 
Poverty 0. 1211335 ** 0.022 
Officers -0. 8691623 0.663 
VeryReligious 0.0116326 0.626 
SD ad -0.3587824 0.287 
Constant 5.371138 0.172 
Adjusted R2 0.3433 
SDad was tested with the same theory of SMom, that children from single parent homes have less 
supervision and are more likely to use drugs. SDad and SMom are strongly correlated, so only 
one of these variables could be used in the model. As one can see SDad was not significant, so 
SMom was used instead. 
Table 6: Results with North, West, and Central included 
Variables ILPDUA ILPDUY Prescripts (robust se) 
Man POMP -0. 3453801 * -0. 5160549* -4.345907 
MML 0. 1715878 0.6029428* 15.59375 ** 
Prescripts 0.0200084** 0.0104378 N/A 
White -0. 0165777** -0. 0034482 0.8523499** 
Old -0. 0481967 0.0534455 -0. 3913381 
College 0.020719 0.031312 -0.768733 
Poverty 0.0338861 0.1011762 3.067884** 
Officers -2.663993 ** -0. 4487119 43.52883 
VeryReligious -0. 0169574 0.0121773 1.037677** 
SM om N/A -0. 0418402 N/A 
North -0.0202129 -0.6683271 -12.10605** 
West 0.2922601 0.2863919 -20.27261 * * 
Central 0.006553 -0. 3390909 -18.27354 
Constant 4.590491 ** 1.493396 -48.73748 
Adjusted R2 0.4497 0.4080 0.7783 (non-adjusted) 
Dummy variables for different regions of the country were also tested. Above is the model that 
tested North, West, and Central in relation to the South. The test produces some results for the 
Prescripts model, but these variables are left out due to a lack of economic theory. More 
regional results can be seen in the next appendix. The positive test for heteroscedasticity can be 
seen in the figure below. 
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Figure 4: Heteroskedasticity test with North, West, and Central included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 5.06 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0245 
28 
Appendix B: Alternate Model with South Variable 
Different combinations of regional dummy variables were added to the three original models 
because of the observation that most of the states with the highest rates of legal prescriptions 
were in the south. The South variable was consistently significant in the Prescripts model, but 
because there was no economic theory to explain why, none of these regional variables were 
included. The results for these alternative models can be seen below. The heteroscedasticity 
tests for the Prescripts models is also included (none of the other tests ever had a positive result). 
Table 7: Results with South included 
Variables ILPDUA ILPDUY Prescripts (robust se) 
ManPDMP -0.3570404 * * -0.5008216 ** -2.646314 
MML 0.299564 0.8100008 ** 14.50314** 
Prescripts 0.0174449 ** 0.0116384 N/A 
White -0.0140342 * -0.0159024 0. 7436254** 
Old -0.0720262 -0.0128918 0.4031175 
College 0.0163115 0.0182986 -0. 9657992* 
Poverty 0.054219 0.1517821 ** 2.301233** 
Officers -2.823442 ** -0.8051157 43.67148 
VeryReligious -0.0160751 0.01602 . 8400425** 
SM om N/A -0.1713371 ** N/A 
South -0.0154482 .2096734 19.26433** 
Constant 4.795837 ** 4.00186 * -33.90059 
Adjusted R2 0.46165 0.3820 0. 7631 (non-adjusted) 
Figure 5: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with South included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi 2(1) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
3.24 
0.0717 
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Table 8: Results with North, West, and South included 
Variables ILPDUA ILPDUY Prescripts (robust se) 
Man POMP -0. 361778 ** -0. 4699904 * -3.462777 
MML 0. 1821372 0.6030981 16.67339 ** 
Prescripts 0.0192594 ** 0.0122614 N/A 
White -0. 015821 ** -0. 007982 0. 7425648 ** 
Old -0. 0482411 0.0407067 -0. 216779 
College 0.0199383 0.0269658 -1.102196 ** 
Poverty 0.0342127 0.0945936 2.595198** 
Officers -2.702581 ** -0. 476467 39.66824 
VeryReligious -0. 0169318 0.0095347 0.8870978 ** 
SM om N/A -0. 0534048 N/A 
North -0.0034613 -0.3820208 4.262954 
West 0.3070262 0.5101605 -5.552083 
South 0.0614397 0.2082239 17.79226** 
Constant 4.602519** 2.037204 -26.6831 
Adjusted R2 0.4506 0.3990 0.7752 (non-adjusted) 
Figure 6: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with North, West, and South included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
4.31 
0.0379 
Table 9: Results with North, Central, and South included 
Variables ILPDUA ILPDUY 
Man POMP -0. 3629687* -0.520799 ** 
MML 0.2122771 0.5657897 
Prescripts 0. 0183469 * * 0.0104059 
White -0. 0133993* 0.0003865 
Old -0. 048086 0.0704414 
College 0.0238124 0.0387641 
Poverty 0.0482356 0.1048218* 
Officers -2.713705** -0. 2820168 
VeryReligious -0. 0155068 0.0149259 
SM om N/A -0. 0184699 
North -0. 2580257 -1.070223* 
Central -0.2322728 -0.7137509* 
South -0. 1835557 0.4294051 
Constant 4.376063 ** 0.6817264 
Adjusted R2 0.4367 0.4133 
Prescripts (robust se) 
-3.836716 
15.93024** 
N/A 
0.7188042** 
-0. 0712077 
-1.165238 ** 
2.350822 ** 
41.66161 
0.9027998** 
N/A 
8.034006 
2.358119 
21.50416** 
-25.965 
0. 7708 (non-adjusted) 
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Figure 7: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with North, Central, and South included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
3.77 
0.0522 
Table 10: Results with West, Central, and South included 
Variables ILPDUA I LP DUY 
Man POMP -0. 3424142* -0.5160315* 
MML 0. 1809221 0.6337203* 
Prescripts 0.0195157** 0.0126732 
White -0. 016297** -0. 0124215 
Old -0. 0496895 0.0273371 
College 0.0202097 0.019921 
Poverty 0.0328182 0. 1004658 
Officers -2.728475** -0. 5167082 
VeryReligious -0. 0185014 0.013152 
SM om N/A -0. 0935403 
West 0.3427405 -0.6116386 
Central 0.0696306 0.1056438 
South 0. 1050674 0.3835207 
Constant 4.670923** 2.78905 
Adjusted R2 0.4517 0.3881 
Prescripts (robust se) 
-4.30806 
16.29506** 
N/A 
0. 7803311 ** 
-0. 0162032 
-1.01563 ** 
2.727536 ** 
40.6747 
0. 9602353 ** 
N/A 
-10.20687** 
-6.746073 
12.1354 ** 
-33.92507 
0. 7787 (non-adjusted) 
Figure 8: Heteroskedasticity test for Prescripts model with West, Central, and South included 
Breusch-Pagan I cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
variables: fitted values of prescriptionsperlOOpeople 
chi2(1) = 5.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0242 
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Appendix C: Economic Significance of Prescripts 
Table 11: Economics Significance Calculation of Prescripts Model 
variable name coeff. mean coeff*mean % of total accounted for 
ManPDMP 0.973143 0.313726 0.3053 0.00152671 
MML 13.08175 0.392157 5.130099 0.025654045 
White 0.637359 70.0833 44.66822 0.223372041 
Old 0.941639 13.97704 13.16133 0.06581575 
College 1.081213 26.50953 28.66245 0.14333209 
Poverty 2.558175 15.21569 38.9244 0.194648942 
Officers 81.06522 0.216341 17.53769 0.087700595 
Very Religious 1.297201 39.76471 51.58282 0.257949827 
Total 199.9723 1 
As one can see, the most economically significant variable in this model is VeryReligious. While 
it is a little surprising that it accounts for this much change in the model, it does make sense 
when one looks at the data and sees that many of the most religious states are in the south. This 
is also the region where one sees some of the highest rates oflegal prescription pain killer 
demand. The next three most economically significant variables are White, Poverty, and 
College. All of these variables are almost twice as significant as the next most significant 
variable, Officers. The high significance of these variables does make sense when one considers 
the theory behind them. The opportunity costs for those with college degrees and above the 
poverty line does seem to be a strong factor. The quality in healthcare, which is reflected in all 
three variables could also be playing a major role. 
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